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ESSAY
ESSENTIALLY ELECTIVE: THE LAW AND IDEOLOGY OF
RESTRICTING ABORTION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
B. Jessie Hill*
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has put on full display the physical and
doctrinal isolation of abortion from health care more generally.1 In early
2020, several states proclaimed that abortions had to be stopped or
delayed for lengthy or indefinite periods of time in order to help fight the
pandemic. Those actions provoked litigation seeking emergency relief to
keep abortion clinics open.2 No similar lawsuits have been necessary to
protect access to other medical procedures. So why was abortion singled
out for disparate treatment?
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Caroline Mala Corbin,
Jonathan Entin, and Liz Sepper for excellent comments and suggestions.
1
See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical
Perspective, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 833, 837–40 (1999); B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and
the Politics of Reproductive Health Care, 50 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 103, 103–04 (2016).
2
The states in which litigation occurred are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Not all of the litigation has resulted in
published opinions. I was involved as counsel in the litigation surrounding Ohio’s order and
its application to abortion providers. Ohio was the first state to seek to enforce an electivesurgeries order against abortion clinics. Greer Donley, Beatrice A. Chen & Sonya Borrero,
The Legal and Medical Necessity of Abortion Care amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, J.L. &
Biosciences (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3584728 [https://perma.cc/QL85-XHKQ].
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This Essay provides an overview of the litigation that ensued in the
wake of some states’ attempts to limit abortion access under the
authority of executive orders limiting “non-essential,” “non-urgent,” or
“elective” medical and surgical procedures. It argues that “abortion
exceptionalism”—that is, “the tendency of legislatures and courts to
subject abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome, rules”—came into
play in two ways.3 First, the COVID-19 crisis allowed anti-abortion
officials to rely on the narrow meaning of “elective” in the abortion
context, as well as underlying ambiguity about the meaning of “elective,”
to argue that abortions are medically unnecessary and can be halted
indefinitely during a pandemic. Second, and relatedly, they used the
exceptional treatment of abortion and the longstanding ambivalence about
the place of abortion within health care to argue that abortion providers’
demands to be treated like every other health care provider under these
executive orders was in fact a claim for special treatment. This Essay ends
by suggesting that, for long-term protection of abortion rights, abortion
must be reframed as a medically necessary and appropriate treatment, and
it must be rhetorically re-incorporated into health care more generally.
I. LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF COVID-19 ABORTION LITIGATION
A. The Orders
In a handful of states, shifting executive and judicial interpretations of
orders banning non-urgent or elective surgeries resulted in a whiplashinducing series of legal maneuvers and highly unstable circumstances on
the ground for those seeking to access or provide abortion services during
the COVID-19 pandemic. This controversy arose because, in mid-March
2020, states had begun adopting orders to limit the medical and/or
surgical procedures that could be performed during the declared
coronavirus emergency.4 Broadly speaking, these orders were supported
3
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (2014); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (2014); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1, 3
(2012). This exceptionalism permeates abortion doctrine. For example, Professor Caroline
Mala Corbin has described how courts set aside traditional free speech principles under the
First Amendment when abortion-related speech is involved. Corbin, supra, at 1190–92.
4
See, e.g., Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Order for the Management of Non-Essential
Surgeries and Procedures Throughout Ohio (Mar. 17, 2020) (rescinded Apr. 30, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/public-health-orders/direct-
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by three justifications: (1) preserving hospital capacity in light of the
likely influx of critically ill coronavirus patients; (2) conserving personal
protective equipment (PPE), such as masks, gloves, and gowns, in short
supply due to the pandemic; and (3) reducing the possibility of
community spread of the virus by minimizing unnecessary providerpatient interactions.5
The question of how such orders should apply to abortion procedures
arose almost immediately. On March 18, 2020, numerous professional
organizations, including the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (“ACOG”), issued a statement affirming that abortion is
essential, time-sensitive health care that should not be delayed during a
pandemic.6 That statement noted: “[A] delay of several weeks, or in some
cases days, may increase the risks or potentially make [abortion]
completely inaccessible. The consequences of being unable to obtain an
abortion profoundly impact a person’s life, health, and well-being.”7
Similarly, the American Medical Association issued a short statement on
March 30, 2020, condemning the politicization of reproductive health
care during the pandemic and asserting that “physicians—not
politicians—should be the ones deciding which procedures are urgentemergent and need to be performed, and which ones can wait, in
partnership with our patients.”8

ors-order-non-essential-surgery-3-17-2020 [https://perma.cc/SXX3-2WTE]; Tex. Governor
Greg Abbott, Executive Order GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020) (superseded Apr. 17, 2020 by GA-15),
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_03-22-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z876-HNLV]; W. Va. Exec. Dep’t, Executive Order
16-20 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://governor.wv.gov/Documents/EO%2016-20electiveprocedures.pdf. [https://perma.cc/KS6A-FQ5E].
5
See sources cited supra note 4; see also, e.g., Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1181
(11th Cir. 2020) (summarizing the state of Alabama’s justifications for its abortion restrictions
related to the COVID-19 pandemic).
6
ACOG et al., Joint Statement on Abortion Access During the COVID-19 Outbreak (Mar.
18, 2020), https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2020/03/joint-statement-on-abortionaccess-during-the-covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/T8CA-K9QS]. This statement was
joined by the American Board of Obstetrics & Gynecology, together with the American
Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists, the American Gynecological & Obstetrical
Society, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the Society for Academic
Specialists in General Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Society of Family Planning, and the
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine.
7
Id.
8
Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Statement on Government Interference in Reproductive Health
Care (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/ama-statements/ama-statementgovernment-interference-reproductive-health-care [https://perma.cc/6SAC-PJD5].

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

102

Virginia Law Review Online

[Vol. 106:99

Several governors and other officials took the opposite tack, declaring
that most “surgical” abortions—and in some cases even medicationinduced abortions—must cease, at least temporarily, during the
pandemic.9 For example, Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves claimed that
his executive order banning “elective procedures” would prevent
abortions, just like the Texas order it was modeled upon.10 In Oklahoma,
the governor declared that all abortions, except emergent procedures or
those necessary to avert a serious medical risk, would be suspended under
a similar order.11 In Ohio, abortion clinics initially believed they were
allowed to continue providing services under the non-essential surgery
order, since “time sensitive” procedures were permitted.12 But not long
after the order became effective, anti-abortion activists began calling
abortion clinics to determine whether they were open, and then advocated
with state officials to obtain an interpretation of the order that would halt
abortions.13 These efforts found success with the Ohio Attorney General,
who subsequently issued cease and desist orders to several Ohio clinics.14
In Ohio, as in several other states, litigation ensued.
B. The Litigation
For the most part, courts decided that it was unconstitutional for states
to ban nearly all abortions under the orders that were designed to
minimize interpersonal contact, preserve PPE, and manage hospital
9
Abortions may be performed medically or surgically. Medication-induced abortions
require only the taking of pills and are available through approximately ten weeks of
pregnancy. So-called “surgical” abortions, which are available both early and later in
pregnancy, are not surgeries in the traditional sense, since they do not usually involve any
incision or a sterile opening. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2316 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016).
10
Ashton Pittman, Governor Attempts To Ban Mississippi Abortions, Citing Need To
Preserve PPE, Jackson Free Press (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2020/apr/10/governor-bans-abortions-mississippi-claiming-need-/ [https://perma.cc/SCR5-9PE4].
11
Ryan Sharp & Carmen Forman, Gov. Kevin Stitt Says Abortions Included in Suspended
Elective Surgeries, Oklahoman (Mar. 27, 2020), https://oklahoman.com/article/5658751/governors-office-clarifies-executive-order-to-include-abortions [https://perma.cc/3CJ3-3326].
12
Ohio Dep’t of Health, supra note 4.
13
CreatedEqualFilms, #StopTheSpread: Abortion Centers Pose Serious Health Risk of
COVID-19 Spread, YouTube (Mar. 20, 2020), https://youtu.be/KKROXMyZ18A
[https://perma.cc/LW2J-T5SH].
14
Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020).
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capacity. District courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Texas all granted temporary relief against attempts to
enforce the orders so as to prevent abortions in all but the most limited
circumstances, such as where the pregnant patient’s life is in danger.15
Appeals courts were more of a mixed bag, with the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits permitting only a narrow subset of abortions to continue, whereas
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits found a wider range of abortion
procedures to be constitutionally protected, even during the pandemic.
The state surgery orders all differed somewhat in their wording and
their duration.16 For example, most orders banned “elective” or “nonessential” surgeries but then listed several criteria to define those terms—
generally in such a way that time-sensitive procedures could still go
forward. A small number prohibited all “procedures” with the exception
of those that are “immediately medically necessary” or those necessary to
treat “an emergency medical condition.”17 Moreover, most orders referred
to surgeries and medical “procedures”; as such they appeared only to limit
surgical abortions, although they were interpreted in some states to
encompass medication abortion as well.18 Some orders were designed to
15
Preterm-Cleveland, 2020 WL 1957173, at *17 (granting preliminary injunction); S. Wind
Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. 20-CV-00277, 2020 WL 1932900, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Apr.
20, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, No. 3:15-CV00705, 2020 WL 1905147, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2020) (granting preliminary
injunction), aff’d as modified, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020), modified, No. 3:15-CV-00705,
2020 WL 2026986 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2020); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v.
Rutledge, No. 4:19-CV-00449, 2020 WL 1862830, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2020) (granting
temporary restraining order), order vacated in part, No. 4:19-CV-00449, 2020 WL 2079224
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2020); Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at
*16 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction); Planned Parenthood Ctr. for
Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323, 2020 WL 1815587, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020)
(granting temporary restraining order), mandamus granted, order vacated in part sub nom. In
re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020).
16
A helpful chart can be found in Donley, Chen & Borrero, supra note 2, at 6–8.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 4. In Texas, for instance, the district court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the state from banning medication abortion during the pandemic. Planned
Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323, 2020 WL 1502102, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2020). After the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the injunction, see In re
Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 2020), the plaintiff clinics moved for a second temporary
restraining order, resulting in a narrower injunction that blocked the order from being applied
to, inter alia, medication abortions. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice, 2020 WL 1815587,
at *7. After the Fifth Circuit stayed that injunction, see In re Abbott, 800 F. App’x 293, 296
(5th Cir. 2020), Planned Parenthood asked the U.S. Supreme Court for an emergency order
vacating the stay as applied to medication abortions. Emergency Application to Justice Alito
To Vacate Administrative Stay of Temporary Restraining Order Entered by the United States
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stay in effect until they were rescinded, whereas others had set expiration
dates.19
Where states interpreted their orders to prohibit abortion, courts’
differing understandings and applications of the relevant doctrinal
framework dictated whether those abortion bans were found to be
constitutional. In particular, courts differed in how they understood the
key Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the government’s public
health powers in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,20 and its interaction with the
key abortion-rights precedents in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey21 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.22
Casey, of course, stands for the proposition that the state may not prevent
a pregnant person from accessing abortion altogether before viability, nor
may it impose an “undue burden” on the ability to do so.23 Whole
Woman’s Health clarified that courts applying this standard should
balance the asserted health benefits of the law against the law’s burdens
on abortion access; if the benefits are outweighed by the burdens, then the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 1, Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No.
19A1019 (Apr. 11, 2020). Before the Supreme Court could act, the Fifth Circuit dissolved its
own stay only as applied to medication abortions, finding that it was unclear whether the
Governor’s order was meant to prohibit them. In re Abbott, 809 F. App’x 200, 202–03 (5th
Cir. 2020). Subsequently, however, that same court issued an opinion holding the second
temporary restraining order invalid and allowing the state to prohibit all abortions (including
medication abortions), except for women whose pregnancies were close to the legal limit for
obtaining a pre-viability abortion. Abbott, 956 F.3d at 724.
19
Compare, e.g., La. Dep’t of Health, Healthcare Facility Notice/Order #2020-COVID19All-007, at 2 (Mar. 21, 2020), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/oph/Coronavirus/resources/providers/LDH-UPDATED-Notice-Med-Surg-Procedures32120.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94TYB6S] (stating the order would remain in effect “until further notice”), and Ohio Dep’t of
Health, supra note 4 (stating the order would remain in effect until the state of emergency no
longer exists or the order is rescinded or modified), with Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, supra
note 4 (specifying an expiration date of Apr. 21, 2020).
20
197 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1905).
21
505 U.S. 833, 844–45 (1992).
22
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016).
23
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–74; see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (same).
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burden is “undue.”24 In addition, courts are not to defer uncritically to
legislatures’ findings regarding the medical benefits of a particular law.25
Seemingly uncomfortable with engaging in business as usual during a
public health crisis, the courts also turned to Jacobson, a 1905 Supreme
Court case involving a constitutional challenge to Massachusetts’s
compulsory smallpox vaccination law. In Jacobson, the Court upheld the
vaccination requirement, stating that courts normally lack “power . . . to
review legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general
welfare,” except if the action “has no real or substantial relation to” public
health, morals, or safety, or if the action “is, beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the [Constitution].”26 They treated
Jacobson, which appears to apply highly deferential review to state
action, as providing relevant doctrinal principles for defining the scope of
constitutional rights during a public health emergency.
However, it is not at all clear that Jacobson, a Lochner-era case
considering the limits of the state’s police powers, has any application
where an individual constitutional right is involved. Nor does it actually
appear to be a case about emergency powers. The central question in
Jacobson—which was decided long before the footnote in United States
v. Carolene Products Co. urging heightened scrutiny for laws affecting
fundamental rights27 and long before the Court recognized an individual
right to bodily integrity and decisional autonomy—was simply whether a
compulsory smallpox vaccination requirement fell within the scope of
state power. In Jacobson, the Court was not faced with any specific claim
of an individual constitutional right—just a generic appeal to FourteenthAmendment “liberty.”28 At the turn of the twentieth century, state laws
were often subject to scrutiny on the ground that they violated individual
24
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. In June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, 140
S. Ct. 2103 (2020), the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana law that was virtually identical
to the Texas law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health. Id. at __ (slip op. at 40). In so doing, a
four-Justice plurality applied the balancing test set forth in Whole Woman’s Health. Id. at __
(slip op. at 2–3). Chief Justice Roberts, who provided the critical fifth vote, concurred
separately and questioned the validity of requiring courts to consider an abortion restriction’s
benefits in relation to its burdens. Id. at __ (slip op. at 2) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Thus, the
balancing test set forth in Whole Woman’s Health remains intact for now, although there are
clearly five Justices—Chief Justice Roberts plus the four other conservative Justices—who
would like to abandon it. See id. at __ (slip op. at 1–2) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
25
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
26
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
27
304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
28
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24, 26.
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liberty and by the same token exceeded the extent of the state’s power to
legislate in the interest of health or safety;29 Lochner-era substantive due
process challenges thus generally asserted that a particular law was
invalid because it was not actually a health law, or because it did not
actually advance the state’s interest in health and safety.30 This claim did
not turn at all on whether the law conflicted with the claimant’s
constitutional rights.
In addition, the scrutiny that the Court applied to the vaccination law
in Jacobson was arguably stricter than its deferential language
indicated.31 As Professor Scott Burris has pointed out, the Jacobson Court
made reference to the wide and deep medical consensus around the safety
and efficacy of vaccination, citing two pages’ worth of medical authority
to that effect, in support of its finding that compulsory vaccination was an
appropriate and legitimate health measure.32 Indeed, Jacobson has often
been treated as a precedent about the limits on states’ public health
powers, not a vindication of unlimited state emergency powers.33
Moreover, if Jacobson was a case about the state’s expansive power in
emergencies, as the states claimed in asserting their authority to ban or
delay abortions in a public health emergency, it is not clear why
vaccination mandates have continued to be upheld on Jacobson’s
authority more than a century later, regardless of whether the mandate
addresses an actual public health emergency.34
29

See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 476, 483 (1996) (“To [Justice
Samuel] Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit states from exercising their police
power. It only forbid them from exceeding that power.”); id. at 493 (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment challenges [around the turn of the twentieth century] asserted . . . that the states
were denying individual freedom and acting beyond the purview of government.”).
30
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
31
Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 933,
961 (1989). Indeed, the application of fairly rigorous review in fact, while using the language
of rational basis review, is arguably the hallmark of cases from the Lochner era. See David N.
Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the
Lochner Era, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 217, 262 (2009).
32
Burris, supra note 31, at 961–62.
33
James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 856–57 (2002) (deriving from
Jacobson four limitations on the power of states to act in the interest of public health); cf.
Parmet, supra note 29, at 493 (noting that “the concept of the police power” at the time of
Jacobson “was used not only to define state power, but to limit it in the name of individual
freedom”).
34
For example, in Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied Jacobson to uphold a general vaccination
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Nonetheless, all of the courts considering challenges to abortion
restrictions during the pandemic applied Jacobson to some degree. Some
courts appeared to understand Jacobson’s language as requiring a higher
showing of unconstitutionality and a greater mismatch between means
and ends than if only Casey and Whole Woman’s Health applied. For
example, the Fifth Circuit treated Jacobson as requiring a form of
arbitrariness review—a standard associated with rational basis scrutiny.35
The Eighth Circuit also adopted this framework, suggesting that even an
otherwise unconstitutional ban on all surgical abortions before viability
might be constitutional in the context of a public health crisis.36 Similarly,
the dissenting judge in the Sixth Circuit case read the “basic principle of
Jacobson” to be “that states may respond to emergencies in the face of
substantive-due-process rights, so long as they act reasonably and don’t
single out specific rights or persons for disfavored treatment.”37 Judged
against the correct understanding of Jacobson in its historical context,
however, this treatment of the case as requiring an elevated showing of

requirement for public schooling and observed that the case generally demonstrates that the
state interest in protecting against communicable disease outweighs the individual’s interest
in refusing unwanted medical interventions. Id. at 19 (citing Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)); see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176
(1922) (relying on Jacobson for the proposition that “compulsory vaccination” is within a
state’s “police power”); Wendy E. Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19,
100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117, 127, 130–31 (2020) (demonstrating that Jacobson has not been
applied, and was not meant to apply, only to emergencies or outbreaks).
35
In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696, 704–05, 716 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784
(5th Cir. 2020); see also Parmet, supra note 34, at 118 (noting that the Fifth Circuit in Abbott
treated Jacobson as “requir[ing] courts to limit their review of constitutional rights during a
public health emergency”).
36
In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2020).
37
Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 934 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J.,
dissenting). Interestingly, in enjoining Kentucky’s ban on drive-in religious services during
the pandemic, the Sixth Circuit glided past Jacobson without applying, or in fact even
mentioning, the language that appeared to require a less stringent level of review. In fact, the
court summed up the only paragraph in which it cited Jacobson with the Delphic assertion:
“While the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, we will not let it sleep through
one.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2020).
Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a church’s request for emergency relief against
California’s ban on larger in-person worship ceremonies. Concurring in the denial, Chief
Justice Roberts cited Jacobson to suggest that the need for particular measures during a
pandemic should be left primarily to the political process. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh,
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented from the denial without so much as mentioning
Jacobson. Id. at 1614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutionality or a less strict form of review for state orders in public
health emergencies appears remarkably anachronistic.
On the other hand, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits held that Jacobson’s
language must be reconciled with the more recent cases identifying a
constitutional right to access abortion. Under this framework, those courts
held that the orders violated patients’ rights to access abortion.38 Perhaps
implicitly recognizing that Casey and Whole Woman’s Health already
required the court to balance state interests against individual rights, those
courts focused on determining whether the burdens of the orders
outweighed their benefits. This balancing test already required
consideration of whether, to echo the language of Jacobson, the orders
lacked a “substantial relation to” the public health goals they sought to
advance.39 In other words, as the Sixth Circuit explained, “context
matters.”40 In the context of a pandemic, the Whole Woman’s Health
standard for deciding whether a burden is “undue” already allows courts
to take into account the urgency and time-sensitivity of the state’s
interests in preserving hospital capacity, maintaining the supply of PPE,
and limiting in-person contact. The court must then balance those benefits
against the burden on the individual’s right to access abortion—which,
here, amounts to a total ban on abortion for the (possibly indefinite)
duration of the orders.
Regardless of whether Jacobson’s language should apply, courts
should have concluded that the elective surgery orders were
unconstitutional as applied to abortion. These orders could be viewed as
either completely banning abortion or as delaying individual abortions for
a period of weeks or more. Viewed as bans on abortion, the orders would
unquestionably be unconstitutional; neither the Supreme Court nor any
federal appellate court has, since Roe v. Wade,41 ever upheld a flat-out
ban on abortion (as opposed to a regulation). Perhaps in order to avoid
this clear precedent, some states argued that their orders required all
abortions to be delayed during the pandemic except if the patient was
nearing the gestational limit for obtaining a legal abortion (usually

38

Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 927 (“[W]e will not countenance . . . the notion that COVID19 has somehow demoted Roe and Casey to second-class rights, enforceable against only the
most extreme and outlandish violations.”); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182–83
(11th Cir. 2020).
39
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 19 (1905).
40
Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 927.
41
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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approximately 22–24 weeks of pregnancy).42 Even understood as delays,
however, the orders would unquestionably and palpably amount to undue
burdens on the abortion right under Casey and Whole Woman’s Health.
Casey upheld a 24-hour waiting period for women seeking abortions, the
purpose of which was to ensure women are able to reflect on their
decisions, but found the constitutionality of that provision to be a “closer
question” than the constitutionality of other restrictions.43 Given that the
delays required by the COVID-19 pandemic would last weeks or longer,
as explained below, the burdens on abortion access imposed by those bans
outweigh the benefits by a substantial margin.
Pregnancy progresses inevitably and relatively quickly, and while
abortion is an extremely safe procedure, the risks associated with abortion
increase later in the pregnancy—approximately 38% per week of delay.44
In addition, more complex surgical procedures are required at later
gestational stages, sometimes even necessitating surgical visits on two
separate days to complete.45 Thus, at a minimum, the health risks are
sufficiently grave if delaying an abortion would require a later and riskier
procedure. In addition, however, every week of delay imposes
unnecessary and therefore unacceptable health risks—especially since
most courts were operating on the understanding that any patient who
wanted an abortion had a right to receive one eventually, and thus that
every abortion would still occur, but much later in the pregnancy.46 The
increased health risks to patients are therefore a serious burden to be
weighed against the questionable benefits.
42
See, e.g., Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 922; In re Abbott, 800 F. App’x 293, 296 (5th Cir.
2020).
43
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992).
44
Linda A. Bartlett, Cynthia J. Berg, Holly B. Shulman, Suzanne B. Zane, Clarice A. Green,
Sara Whitehead & Hani K. Atrash, Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality
in the United States, 103 Obstetrics & Gynecology 729, 731 (2004). Carrying a pregnancy to
term—a process that also generally involves medical intervention—is several times riskier
than abortion; thus, arguably all abortions avert serious health risks. See Suzanne Zane,
Andreea A. Creanga, Cynthia J. Berg, Karen Pazol, Danielle B. Suchdev, Denise J. Jamieson
& William M. Callaghan, Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States 1998–2010, 126
Obstetrics & Gynecology 258, 264 (2015), https://journals.lww.com/greenjournal/Fulltext/2015/08000/Abortion_Related_Mortality_in_the_United_States_.6.aspx [https://perma.cc/D8C3-3XMH]; CDC, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System 2, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm
[https://perma.cc/4A6P-9GNH].
45
Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *7 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020); Bartlett et al., supra note 44, at 735.
46
See sources cited supra note 42.
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Those benefits were purported to be saving PPE, preserving hospital
capacity, and minimizing personal contact. But given that under the
states’ positions, pregnant people would be able to receive abortions
eventually—just later than they wished to—these interests would not be
served. The later procedures would use just as much or more PPE; the
personal contact would still occur, and hospitalization—while always
unlikely with an abortion, which is a safe outpatient procedure—would if
anything be more likely the longer the person remained pregnant and the
later and more complicated the abortion procedure became. Thus, the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits correctly held that the COVID abortion bans
lacked a “substantial relation” to their public health goals and were
“plain[ly and] palpab[ly]” unconstitutional under Whole Woman’s
Health.47
Ultimately, most of the litigation surrounding non-essential surgery
orders has been mooted or otherwise fizzled out. Many states’ orders
expired or else were replaced by more lenient orders that clearly allowed
abortions to proceed along with most other outpatient surgeries.48 Thus,
the legal issue has died down for now, although litigation will likely recur
if a new wave of COVID cases leads to a short supply of PPE and hospital
beds.49 But beyond its possible relevance to future litigation, the case law
47

Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
48
See, e.g., Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Stay Safe Ohio Order 3 (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Directors-Stay-Safe-Ohio-Order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JD5F-CKMC]; Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, Executive Order GA-15 (Apr.
17, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-15_hospital_capacity_COVID19_TRANS_04-17-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYB7-L5T7] (allowing non-medically
necessary surgeries to proceed if they would not deplete hospital capacity or PPE). One
notable exception is Arkansas, which replaced its stringent ban on abortions not “necessary to
protect the life or health of the patient” with an order, adopted April 27, 2020, allowing
virtually all “elective” surgeries to proceed but requiring even asymptomatic patients to
provide a negative test result for COVID-19 within 48 hours of the surgery. Although some
health care facilities presumably have access to such tests, this requirement proved nearly
impossible for abortion clinics to meet. Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, No.
4:20-CV-00470, 2020 WL 2240105, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. May 7, 2020).
49
In Texas, for example, the Governor rolled back the state’s reopening and imposed new
restrictions on elective surgeries, although the new elective surgeries order appears not to
apply to abortions. Emma Platoff, Texas Bans Elective Surgeries in More than 100 Counties
as Coronavirus Hospitalizations Keep Climbing, Tex. Tribune (July 9, 2020),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/09/texas-coronavirus-hospitalizations-elective-surgeries/ [https://perma.cc/TS6H-8EM7]. Other states, too, have begun shutting down again in
response to spikes in COVID-19 infection rates. See Jasmine C. Lee, Sarah Mervosh, Yuriria
Avila, Barbara Harvey & Alex Leeds Matthews, See How All 50 States Are Reopening (and
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arising out of the abortion restrictions adopted during the pandemic
contains useful lessons about the rhetorical framing of abortion even
during non-pandemic times.
II. IDEOLOGY: THE LOGIC BEHIND THE COVID ABORTION BANS
The fight over abortion access during the COVID-19 pandemic has
roots that stretch back well before 2020. Since the Supreme Court
recognized a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade,
a series of historical contingencies and intentional choices has led to
abortions being provided primarily in freestanding clinics that are
separate from “mainstream” medical institutions such as hospitals and
physicians’ offices. This result has coincided with the development of a
unique doctrinal framework for analyzing the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions that is largely dissimilar to the framework for analyzing any
other constitutional right, leading to the perception that abortion is sui
generis in constitutional law.50 This evolution has produced two kinds of
abortion exceptionalism that make a recognizable appearance in the
COVID abortion ban cases: considering most abortions to be elective,
unlike comparable medical procedures, and framing abortion providers’
requests for equal treatment as requests for special treatment. As I discuss
in Part III, these phenomena are problematic for abortion doctrine, both
within the pandemic-orders context and outside of it.
A. “Elective” Abortion
Most states’ orders temporarily banned “elective” or “non-essential”
surgeries.51 Those terms were then further defined in the orders. Yet,
Closing Again), N.Y. Times (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/SD6T-NW7X].
50
I discuss this phenomenon in a forthcoming article. B. Jessie Hill, The Geography of
Abortion Rights, 109 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 20–21, 21 n.97) (on file
with author).
51
The states temporarily banning “elective” surgeries were Arkansas, Iowa, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Arkansas Dep’t of Health, ADH Directive on Elective Surgeries
(Apr. 3, 2020) (superseded Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/pdf/Elective_Procedure_Directive_April_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WBPK2K2]; Governor Kimberly K. Reynolds, Proclamation of Disaster Emergency (Mar. 26,
2020) (superseded Apr. 24, 2020), https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Public%20Health%20Proclamation%20-%202020.03.26.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDW8-CZAW]; Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Order for the Management of Non-Essential Surgeries
and Procedures Throughout Ohio (Mar. 17, 2020) (rescinded Apr. 30, 2020),

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

112

Virginia Law Review Online

[Vol. 106:99

because of this wording, anti-abortion officials were able to exploit a
particular popular understanding of electiveness in the abortion context
that would not apply to other medical procedures.
Strictly speaking, in medical terminology an “elective” surgery is
simply one that can be scheduled ahead of time, as opposed to one that is
emergently performed.52 In popular parlance, by contrast, elective surgery
is often understood to refer to procedures that are optional or not
medically necessary, such as cosmetic surgery.53 Yet it does not appear
that either meaning was intended by those orders banning “elective”
surgeries. Instead, the orders often outlined specific factors to define what
constitutes essential, non-elective surgery. Generally, those factors
included time sensitivity and aggravation of an underlying condition—
thus allowing a range of procedures to go forward that would not
necessarily qualify as emergent.54
As used in the abortion context, the term “elective” has yet another
meaning, which state officials appeared to rely upon in claiming they
should not be performed during the pandemic. In the abortion context,
“elective” almost always refers to those abortions that are not performed
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/public-health-orders/directors-order-non-essential-surgery-3-17-2020 [https://perma.cc/ZCT8-5GDU]; Okla. Exec.
Order 2020-07 (Fourth Amended) (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/1919.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAG4-KHP6]; Tenn. Exec. Order 25 (Apr. 8, 2020)
(expired Apr. 30, 2020), https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orderslee25.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5L3-N2SJ].
52
See, e.g., Michelle J. Bayefsky, Deborah Bartz & Katie L. Watson, Abortion During the
Covid-19 Pandemic—Ensuring Access to an Essential Health Service, 382 New Eng. J. Med.
e47(1), e47(2) (2020); Benjamin Elliot Yelnosky Smith, Deborah Bartz, Alisa B. Goldberg &
Elizabeth Janiak, “Without Any Indication”: Stigma and a Hidden Curriculum Within Medical
Students’ Discussion of Elective Abortion, 214 Soc. Sci. & Med. 26, 27 (2018) (“The word
‘elective’ has had a consistent medical meaning since as early as 1936 when it was used to
describe surgeries that could be planned rather than done emergently.”).
53
Smith et al., supra note 52, at 27.
54
See, e.g., Governor Kimberly K. Reynolds, supra note 51; Ohio Dep’t of Health, supra
note 4. Those states that did not use the term “elective” applied a variety of standards to
identify the procedures that would be banned. Alabama initially banned “elective” procedures
but then amended that order to permit only those procedures “necessary to treat an emergency
medical condition” or “necessary to avoid serious harm from an underlying condition or
disease, or necessary as part of a patient’s ongoing and active treatment.” Robinson v.
Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2020) (quoting
Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Health, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public
Gatherings due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Mar. 27, 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In Texas, the order allowed procedures to go forward if the patient would otherwise
“be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death, as determined by the patient’s
physician.” Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, supra note 4.
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for a reason relating to a separate or underlying medical condition of the
pregnant person or the fetus.55 Indeed, one study involving medical
students planning to practice obstetrics and gynecology found that they
used the term “elective” to contrast with medically necessary or medically
indicated, by which they meant an abortion due to fetal anomaly or a
separate health condition of the pregnant woman.56
On this definition of electiveness, the overwhelming majority of
abortions in the U.S. are elective. In a 2005 study, only 12% of women
indicated that they were choosing abortion at least partially because of a
possible health issue, and only 4% indicated that it was the most important
reason.57 Another 13% indicated an issue with the health of the fetus
factored into the decision, with only 3% stating it was the most important
reason.58 Instead, most women choose abortion in response to an
unintended pregnancy for reasons related to their unreadiness or inability
to parent a child (or an additional child).59
This problematic definition of “elective” abortion is a form of abortion
exceptionalism, as it uniquely stigmatizes the abortion decision and
adopts a concept of electiveness that would not apply to other surgeries.
The notion that abortions chosen for particular reasons are somehow
optional or non-therapeutic implies that the natural and expected course
for all women and pregnant people is parenthood and that terminating a
pregnancy is a “choice,” but continuing one is not. (We do not, for

55
Smith et al., supra note 52, at 27; Katie Watson, Why We Should Stop Using the Term
“Elective Abortion”, 20 AMA J. Ethics 1175, 1176 (2018).
56
See Smith et al., supra note 52, at 29. Similarly, in a recent case involving a challenge to
an ordinance that attempted to exclude surgical abortion clinics from operating within a
particular city, the parties disputed whether abortion services fell within a zoning provision
allowing for facilities providing outpatient services that were “therapeutic, preventative or
correctional.” FemHealth USA, Inc. v. City of Mount Juliet, No. 3:19-CV-01141, 2020 WL
2098234, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2020). Drawing a distinction between therapeutic medical
procedures and those it presumably deemed elective, the City claimed “abortion . . . is not
preventative. It is not correctional. There are therapeutic abortions where the life or health of
the mother is at risk.” City of Mount Juliet’s Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 11, FemHealth USA, Inc. v. City of Mount Juliet, 2020 WL 2098234 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28,
2020) (No. 3:19-CV-01141).
57
Lawrence B. Finer, Lori F. Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M.
Moore, Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37
Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 110, 112–14 (2005).
58
Id. Of course, as one scholar has pointed out, in another sense, “[e]very abortion is
elective,” since even patients facing serious health risks can choose whether to have the
procedure or undergo the risks to their health. Watson, supra note 55, at 1176.
59
Finer et al., supra note 57, at 110–12.
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example, generally speak of elective childbirth.) Indeed, the common
rhetorical framing—or euphemizing—of the right to terminate a
pregnancy as the “right to choose” may contribute to this unspoken
understanding of abortion as a “choice.”60 This framing stigmatizes the
decision to end a pregnancy, while failing to apply similar scrutiny to the
decision to become a parent. And it assumes that an abortion is acceptable
if it results from a wanted pregnancy “gone wrong,” but not if it results
from a mistake or a so-called “social” reason.61 As Professor Katie
Watson puts it, this framing valorizes “women who accept the social
norms that women are meant to be mothers and that women cannot have
sex solely for pleasure instead of for procreation.”62 As she further points
out, we do not generally label knee replacement surgery, for example, as
“elective” simply because it is a way of resisting the natural deterioration
of the knee cartilage, and we do not pass judgment on the decision to seek
that surgery or the reasons for it, even if certain individual choices, such
as deciding to play sports, contributed to the patient’s predicament.63
Thus, using the concept of “elective” abortion in its popular sense further
emphasizes the separateness of abortion from health care generally and
treats it as a moral choice, rather than as a medical decision.64
Nonetheless, by relying on the meaning that the term “elective” usually
has when it is applied to abortion, some states were able to clamp down
on abortion access. In Texas and Oklahoma, for example, the state took
the position that only abortions provided to avert a “medical emergency”
could go forward.65 Similarly, in Tennessee, the order was interpreted to
ban all surgical abortions except those “required to . . . prevent rapid
deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical
condition.”66 In Ohio, the state argued that the order allowed surgical
abortions only to protect the patient’s life or health, or those that were

60

Thanks to Jonathan Entin for pointing this out.
See Smith et al., supra note 52, at 29.
62
Watson, supra note 55, at 1178.
63
Id. at 1175.
64
Id.; see also Smith et al., supra note 52, at 26 (“‘Elective’ negatively marked and isolated
some abortions, and participants used the term to convey judgement about patients’ social and
reproductive histories.”).
65
S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. 20-CV-00277, 2020 WL 1932900, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 20, 2020); Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323,
2020 WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020).
66
Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 931 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J.,
dissenting).
61
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close to the legal limit for performing a pre-viability abortion.67 Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit held that because medication abortions were allowed
to proceed and because the clinics had not identified how many women
would actually be affected by the ban (and therefore could not quantify
the burden on abortion access), the “right to elective abortion”—meaning
the right to reproductive autonomy—had not been clearly violated.68
In addition to exploiting this unique definition of electiveness, antiabortion officials sometimes relied upon it to create uncertainty about the
application of state orders in a way that put abortion clinics in a bind. In
a number of cases, officials threatened enforcement actions while refusing
to tell abortion clinics which abortions the state considered to be
“elective” or medically unnecessary. In the case of Ohio, even after the
clinics brought suit, the state refused to explain which abortions were
permissible under the order—despite the fact that criminal penalties
attached to a violation of the surgery order.69 Similarly, in Alabama, the
district court observed that the meaning of the state’s order with respect
to abortion “was not immediately clear,” and that, “[i]n part because
abortion providers in Alabama operate in an atmosphere of hostility, the
[clinics] sought clarification of whether the restrictions allow the
continued performance of abortions.”70 The court further noted that
“[r]epeated efforts to clarify the application of the medical restrictions to
abortion, including by the plaintiffs and by [the] court . . . yielded
multiple inconsistent interpretations” by the state.71 This refusal to
provide clarity left the clinics vulnerable to various civil and criminal
sanctions and naturally had a chilling effect on their willingness to
perform abortions.
Moreover, even in those states that specified a narrow understanding
of which abortions qualified as medically necessary or non-elective, it
was not self-evident what constituted a threat to a patient’s “health” or a
“serious adverse consequence[] to a patient’s physical condition” in the

67

Combined Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Merits Brief at 12–13, Yost
v. Preterm-Cleveland, No. 20-3365 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020).
68
In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1028–32 (8th Cir. 2020).
69
Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020). The state had also sent health inspectors to examine the records of three
abortion clinics but never revealed whether it found any violations of the orders. Id.
70
Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12,
2020).
71
Id.
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context of abortion.72 For example, is the significantly increased risk
brought about by any meaningful delay enough to qualify under this
language?73 Or is something more required? Even outside the
reproductive health context, medical necessity is a poorly defined concept
that is often left to individual physicians to apply.74 The states that applied
elective surgery bans to prohibit most or nearly all abortions—all of
which had previously exhibited hostility to abortion rights—were able to
exploit this underlying uncertainty.
B. “Exempting” Abortion
The abortion-specific understandings of electiveness and medical
necessity also led some courts to see the plaintiffs’ claims for equal
treatment with other health care providers as asking for an exemption
under the orders. This framing of requests for equal treatment as requests
for special treatment was also a form of abortion exceptionalism.75
Because abortion is understood as uniquely medically unnecessary or
optional, in a way that other medical procedures are not, the requests of
abortion providers to be treated like other physicians providing essential
services was seen as aberrational.
Primarily, this reversal of plaintiffs’ claims for equal treatment took the
form of state officials declining to afford abortion providers the sort of
deference that other medical professionals likely would receive when
deciding whether a surgery should proceed under the order. For example,
in Alabama, state officials initially interpreted the surgery order to allow
abortions only where necessary to preserve the life or health of the
woman.76 After the state changed its position, the district court sought an
assurance that “[t]he reasonable medical judgment of abortion providers
will be treated with the same respect and deference as the judgments of
other medical providers,” and that “[t]he decisions will not be singled out
72

Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 931 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J.,
dissenting).
73
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74
B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining
“Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 Am.
J.L. & Med. 445, 450–57 (2012); Wendy K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights After Health Care
Reform: Who Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 1515, 1516–17
(1994).
75
See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
76
Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12,
2020).

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2020]

Essentially Elective

117

for adverse consequences because the services in question are abortions
or abortion-related.”77 The state resisted this formulation, however, and
refused to agree not to second-guess abortion providers’ decisions.78
Similarly, in Ohio, the providers asked the court “for their case-by-case
determinations regarding the essential nature of an abortion procedure to
be treated the same as other Ohio healthcare professionals’
determinations regarding the essential nature of other procedures.”79 This
equal treatment clearly had not been provided. For example, the state
contended it had received complaints about three abortion clinics
purportedly performing elective surgeries, as well as a similar complaint
about a urology clinic. Yet, while Ohio sent inspectors to review the
surgery records of the abortion clinics, there was no evidence it had taken
any steps to investigate the urology clinic.80 In Texas, the state highlighted
its tendency to view abortion as sui generis among medical procedures
when answering a question posed to it in writing by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Trying to determine whether medication-only abortion was
covered by the state order banning non-medically necessary procedures,
the court asked the parties to explain “[w]hat medical acts should be
considered analogous to medication abortion.”81 The State of Texas
answered: “Medication abortions are unique. Petitioners are unaware of
other procedures that involve the use of medication to achieve a medical
result that is not tied to treating or managing a disease or harmful
condition.”82
Differential treatment of abortion providers is normalized by the stigma
that permeates abortion provision, treats abortion services as outside of
mainstream health care, and assumes almost all abortions are, by default,
elective. Thus, the providers’ requests to be allowed to make their own
determinations whether a particular surgery for a particular patient
qualified as essential and non-elective were cast by states, and some
courts, as requests for “blanket exemption[s].”83 In fact, in In re Rutledge,
77

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
79
Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *16 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020).
80
Id. at *16 n.19.
81
Petitioners’ Letter Brief at 4, In re Abbott, No. 20-50296 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020).
82
Id.
83
Preterm-Cleveland, 2020 WL 1957173, at *9; see also Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery,
956 F.3d 913, 928 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he State suggests that if we permit this one exemption,
surely the joint-replacement surgeons, the cataract-removal specialists, and every other
78
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this abortion exceptionalism led the Eighth Circuit down a perplexingly
incorrect doctrinal path. In determining whether Arkansas’s surgery order
could be mobilized to ban all surgical abortions in the state, the court
declined to consider whether the order violated the Constitution as applied
to abortion; instead, it only considered whether the directive itself—
requiring suspension of all “elective” surgeries—was valid.84 The court
asserted that it could not “take a piecemeal approach and scrutinize
individual surgical procedures or otherwise create an exception for
particular providers, such as those performing non-emergency, surgical
abortions.”85 Not only does this formulation label nearly all abortions
elective, but it also ignores the existence of the fundamental right to
abortion and incorrectly applies Supreme Court precedent. Specifically,
it ignores case law requiring courts to weigh the benefits and burdens of
all restrictions on abortion as applied to abortion patients and providers—
even those arising from laws that do not single out abortion but instead
apply to other procedures as well. For example, in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, the Court considered whether Texas’s surgical-center law
unduly burdened abortion access, although that law applied to (and
remained valid as applied to) facilities other than abortion clinics.86 But
when the Eighth Circuit balanced benefits and burdens, it considered the
benefits of the surgery order generally rather than with respect to abortion,
stating that “the purpose of the . . . directive is to delay all non-emergency
medical provider affected by EO-25’s bar on elective procedures will follow . . . .”); In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that the district court’s order allowing
abortions to proceed during the pandemic “bestow[ed] on [surgical] abortion providers a
blanket exemption from a generally-applicable emergency public health measure” (quoting In
re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020))). At the same time, abortion providers were
uniquely disabled in many cases from pursuing measures that would allow them to conserve
PPE and limit exposure, such as using telemedicine for providing medication abortion. While
telemedicine has been available and encouraged during the pandemic for most procedures,
state laws requiring in-person visits for abortion inhibited its expansion to abortion services.
See Ushma D. Upadhyay & Daniel Grossman, Telemedicine for Medication Abortion, 100
Contraception 351, 351 (2019).
84
Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1028–29.
85
Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
86
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299, 2314 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016); see also Women’s Med.
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The generally applicable and neutral
regulation in this case (the transfer agreement requirement) affects an abortion clinic, which
is unable to satisfy the regulation’s requirements. Therefore, Casey and other relevant case
law regarding state restrictions on abortion apply.”); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.
v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[B]y requiring the plaintiff to undergo the
CON review process, the defendants would impose a substantial and unconstitutional burden
on the right of access to abortion.”).
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surgeries so that the State may conserve its finite amount of PPE resources
and limit social contact,” and that this purpose is advanced by the
directive.87 It then weighed that general benefit against the specific burden
on abortion rights.
Because abortion is often burdened by facially neutral laws, and
because undue-burden analysis requires courts to evaluate the specific
benefits and burdens of a regulation as applied to abortion, this analysis
is misguided. Moreover, it suggests that it would be singling out abortion
for special treatment to consider the benefits of the law specifically as
applied to abortion while declining to analyze the law in the same way
with respect to other surgeries. But of course, other surgeries are not
afforded the same constitutional protection as abortion, which has
implications not just for pregnant people’s health, but also for their
reproductive autonomy and their future.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Officials who interpreted their elective surgery orders to ban abortion
were working with a unique understanding of electiveness, applicable
only to abortion, that cast the request of abortion providers for equal
treatment as a request for a special exemption. Yet, abortion can and
should be understood as non-elective, or medically necessary, for several
reasons. First, as noted above, carrying a pregnancy to term is
significantly riskier than ending a pregnancy; moreover, even carrying a
pregnancy substantially longer than necessary or longer than desired
brings additional health risks.88 Second, abortion is the ultimate timesensitive procedure, since it may be sought only during a particular
window (which is often shortened by state laws prohibiting abortions after
a specific point in the pregnancy). Finally, seeking an abortion is an
exercise of reproductive autonomy; an abortion may be necessary to a
person’s quality of life and ability to function at home, at work, and in
society at large—just as other surgical procedures may be. Like other
health conditions, pregnancy is a condition that, if allowed to progress,
will result in physical changes, health risks, and very long-term
consequences for the patient.
Of course, the person’s subjective attitude toward the pregnancy—
whether those physical changes and effects on their life are wanted or
87
88

Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1031.
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
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unwanted—determines the medical appropriateness of abortion for them,
just as an individual patient’s attitudes and values may determine the
medical appropriateness of other medical interventions. But this fact does
not imply that the pregnant person’s reasons for wanting or not wanting
the abortion are relevant to its medical appropriateness—that is, to its
“electiveness.”89 The decision not to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term
is a medical decision to protect one’s health and one’s body against
undesired physical changes that will have a lifelong impact.90
This insight suggests that the framing of most, or even some, abortions
as “elective” is deeply problematic. It not only stigmatizes the deeply
considered decisions of patients, but it also distorts the doctrine, including
by introducing abortion exceptionalism and uncertainty into the analysis
of the surgery orders during the pandemic. Further, it aggravates the
isolation of abortion providers from other health care providers, making
it less likely that physicians will want to engage in abortion provision and
leaving them more vulnerable to harassment and violence.91
The alternative approach would be to integrate abortion into the health
care framework by viewing patients’ abortion decisions as analogous to
other patients’ health care decisions. This would also mean that
reproductive-rights scholars and advocates should avoid the use of terms
like “elective”—which possess no clear meaning, except in the most
limited contexts, in any case—and avoid using the term “choice” as a
stand-in for abortion or abortion rights.92 Moreover, abortion providers
should be accorded the same respect as other health care providers, who
were largely left alone during the pandemic to implement the orders
through internal institutional policies that were not subjected to further
review.
One concern with suggesting that abortion should be treated like other
medical decisions is that it implies a sort of “leveling down” of the
89
See Katie Watson, Scarlet A: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Ordinary Abortion 170–74
(2018) [hereinafter Watson, Scarlet A]; Watson, supra note 55.
90
As Professor Katie Watson and others have observed, the debate over when abortion is
appropriate is thus really a debate about the moral value of the embryo or fetus vis-à-vis that
of the woman. See, e.g., Watson, Scarlet A, supra note 89, at 173–74. I agree with this view
but do not address that second question, regarding the moral status of the embryo or fetus,
here since it is separate from the question of when, if ever, abortion is “elective” or medically
unnecessary.
91
See Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, supra note 50, at 24.
92
Cf. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1410–11 (2009) (critiquing the rhetoric of choice on other
grounds).
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abortion right, insofar as other health care procedures do not generally
enjoy the same constitutional protection as abortion. Indeed, the fact that
abortion implicates reproductive autonomy—a constitutionally protected
interest—implies that it should be singled out for especially favorable
treatment, not unfavorable treatment, as compared to similar procedures.
Yet, as the course of events during the COVID-19 pandemic has
illustrated, other health care providers and procedures are more likely to
be protected by the political process. Indeed, the repeal of electivesurgeries bans that largely ended the abortion-related litigation were
likely motivated by concerns of hospitals and patients seeking other kinds
of procedures.93 News stories detailed the negative effects that elective
surgery bans were having on patients as well as on the bottom lines of
hospitals.94 Those hospitals have enormous political clout.95 Thus, if the
interests of abortion providers and clinics were taken into account in the
same way as those of other health care providers, and if they were
considered an integral part of that larger group, they might be afforded
the same degree of deference with respect to their decision making. In
addition, as Professor Robin West has argued,96 it is possible that
engaging the political process rather than relying solely on courts for
protection of abortion rights could, in the long run, enable a political
discourse that argues for certain rights and benefits that cannot be
accommodated within the current reproductive-rights framework—
93

See, e.g., Laura Garcia, San Antonio Hospitals Could Resume Elective Surgeries
Under Abbott’s New Order, San Antonio Express-News (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://www.expressnews.com/business/health-care/article/San-Antonio-hospitals-couldresume-elective-15209439.php [https://perma.cc/X7V5-2WPN].
94
Id.; see also Jenny Gold, Some Hospitals Continue with Elective Surgeries Despite
COVID-19 Crisis, Kaiser Health News (Mar. 20, 2020), https://khn.org/news/some-hospitalscontinue-with-elective-surgeries-despite-covid-19-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/VA9Q-SZ6L]
(explaining the difficult financial calculus faced by hospitals in deciding whether to shut down
elective surgeries in order to maintain public safety); C.J. LeMaster, Ban on Elective
Procedures/Surgeries Impacts Rural Hospitals Already at Risk of Closure, WLOX (Apr. 21,
2020), wlox.com/2020/04/21/ban-elective-proceduressurgeries-impacts-rural-hospitals-already-risk-closure/ (detailing rural Mississippi hospital kept afloat by elective surgeries).
95
See generally Steven I. Weissman, Remedies for an Epidemic of Medical Provider Price
Gouging, Fla. Bar J. 23, 28, 28 n.55 (Feb. 2016) (noting that medical industry lobbying
expenditures exceeded those of the defense, aerospace, oil, and gas industries combined);
Jennifer Haberkorn, Hospitals Flex Lobbying Muscle, Politico (Jan. 7, 2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/hospitals-flex-lobbying-muscle-to-bypass-somecuts-085814 [https://perma.cc/R8TV-EHC8] (“Hospitals have some of the strongest lobbying
muscle because every member of Congress has at least one in their district. They don’t just
provide needed health care but are typically one of the largest employers, too.”).
96
See West, supra note 92, at 1412–21.
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including a right to positive goods like child care, health care, and
protection from intimate violence, all of which are necessary for full
reproductive dignity and autonomy.
On the other hand, it is possible that all health care should share a
degree of constitutional protection. While it has largely been unnecessary
to protect access to other medical procedures with a constitutional right,
since legislators rarely see political benefits in attacking orthopedic
surgery or restricting access to heart medications, there may nonetheless
be constitutional limits on the extent to which the government can
interfere in private health care decisions.97 At a minimum, there is already
a constitutionally protected right to make certain significant medical
decisions, such as refusing treatment and accessing medication for severe
pain.98
The rhetorical integration of abortion into health care may be a part of
a post-Roe v. Wade strategy as well. If Roe v. Wade is one day overruled,
and the permissibility of abortion is left to individual states, it is possible
that some states will consider adopting bans on so-called elective abortion
while permitting medically necessary abortions.99 A robust understanding
of abortion as medically necessary could be useful in combatting attempts
to cabin abortion access in this way, either by making it unthinkable in
some states to separate out so-called therapeutic from non-therapeutic
abortions, or by bolstering the authority of individual patients and
physicians to make decisions about which abortions are “medically
necessary,” without second-guessing from the state. If abortion providers
could draw on the political power of the broader health care community,
it would also be more likely that abortion access would remain protected
in a post-Roe world.
CONCLUSION
The litigation over the application of non-essential surgery bans
exemplifies underlying tensions in the legal and popular understandings
97
This argument is made at greater length in B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right To
Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 313–18
(2007).
98
Id. at 329–32.
99
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a
Post-Roe World, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 611, 626 (2007) (noting that the question of whether a
state could regulate abortion even when it poses risks to the woman’s health would still arise
in a post-Roe world).
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of abortion that are likely to have an impact beyond the end of the
pandemic. Access to abortion is threatened by a tendency to single out
abortion for uniquely unfavorable treatment within both law and
medicine. Long-term protection of abortion rights could be advanced
through rhetorical reframing of abortion and bolstering an understanding
of abortion as a medically necessary and appropriate health care decision,
regardless of the patient’s reason for choosing it.

